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Abstract 
The analysis and recognition of China’s current income distribution pattern is a major practical issue 
that involves the idea and essentials of advancing modern state governance in the stage of economic 
and social transition, and also a controversial issue. In this paper, the author focused on two major 
points. First, the analysis on the basic situation of the proportion of resident income in the overall 
income distribution pattern in recent decade in China, which first went down and then rose slightly, is 
conducted. Then the paper emphasized that the key to solve the paradox formed by two mainstream 
views was to understand more deeply the institutional causes of the unfairness and non-standardization 
inherent in high Gini coefficient of income distribution in China, which was an essential real problem. 
Second, based on an examination of the significance of cultivating and developing the mid-income 
class in China, the serious shortcomings of official statistics about income quintile information must be 
pointed out. Thus, it is imperative to recognize the covered contradictions, face the anxiety state and 
related challenges that the mid-income class in China has been stuck in, and then seek to solve the 
contradiction and eliminate the anxiety in a targeted manner. 
Keywords 
income distribution, hidden off-the-books income, quintile of the income, anxiety of the mid-income 
class  
 
How to optimize China’s income distribution pattern and related institutional mechanisms is a major 
practical issue in promoting the modernization of the country’s governance system and governance 
capacity during the economic and social transition. This paper examines the basic pattern of the current 
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income distribution and its key issues in China, and outlines the specific challenges of nurturing and 
expanding the middle class. 
 
1. The Proportion of the Resident’s Income Has Risen Slightly after a Downturn, and Some 
Residents Have Considerable off-the-Books Incomes. The Critical Issue Is to Focus on Unfairness 
and Non-Standardization and Its Institutional Causes 
Since the reform and opening up, there has been a series of changes in the overall pattern of national 
income distribution with the economic and social development in China. From 2000 to 2014, compared 
with the growth rate of per capita GDP, the residents’ income experienced a process of falling first and 
then rising. In the first 8 years (2000-2008), the actual average annual growth rate of per capita GDP in 
China was 10%. The actual average annual growth rate of urban per capita disposable income was 
9.9%. The actual average annual growth rate of rural per capita net income was 6.4%. Both of them 
were lower than the economic growth rate. In the following 6 years (2008-2014), the actual average 
annual growth rate of per capita GDP was 8.1%, while the actual average annual growth rates of both 
urban per capita disposable income and rural per capita net income were 8.2% and 10% respectively, 
which exceeded the economic growth rate. It can be seen that the proportion of household income in 
national income experienced a process of first falling and then rising. 
According to the data of the National Bureau of Statistics, from 2000 to 2014, the proportion of the 
government, enterprises and residents in the primary distribution and the secondary distribution of the 
national income can be calculated and shown as follows. (Refer to Tables 1 and 2 respectively). 
 
Table 1. The Primary Distribution of National Income from 2000 to 2014 
Year 
Primary Distribution (Unit: 100 million Yuan) Proportion 
Household Government 
Non-financial 
Corporate 
Financial 
Institutions 
Household Government 
Non-financial 
Corporate 
Financial 
Institutions 
2000 65,811.00 12,865.20 18,529.92 794.40 67.15% 13.13% 18.91% 0.81% 
2001 71,248.72 13,697.28 21,617.68 1,504.54 65.93% 12.67% 20.00% 1.39% 
2002 76,801.57 16,599.95 23,666.49 2,027.70 64.49% 13.94% 19.87% 1.70% 
2003 86,512.46 18,387.52 27,132.28 2,944.75 64.09% 13.62% 20.10% 2.18% 
2004 97,489.67 21,912.66 36,979.34 3,071.90 61.14% 13.74% 23.19% 1.93% 
2005 112,517.06 26,073.94 41,532.18 3,494.24 61.28% 14.20% 22.62% 1.90% 
2006 131,114.93 31,372.99 48,192.56 5,223.88 60.73% 14.53% 22.32% 2.42% 
2007 158,805.28 39,266.86 61,525.47 6,824.39 59.61% 14.74% 23.09% 2.56% 
2008 185,395.44 46,549.14 74,609.24 9,476.51 58.66% 14.73% 23.61% 3.00% 
2009 206,544.03 49,606.34 73,275.18 10,894.40 60.69% 14.58% 21.53% 3.20% 
2010 241,864.51 59,926.74 83,385.82 14,582.48 60.50% 14.99% 20.86% 3.65% 
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2011 284,282.94 72,066.93 94,853.93 17,358.58 60.67% 15.38% 20.24% 3.70% 
2012 319,462.37 80,975.88 97,023.47 20,753.02 61.65% 15.63% 18.72% 4.00% 
2013 353,759.88 88,745.04 120,826.03 19,865.78 60.66% 15.22% 20.72% 3.41% 
2014 387,473.11 98,266.40 137,142.34 21,909.25 60.09% 15.24% 21.27% 3.40% 
Source: Flows-of-funds accounts revised in the economic censuses in 2008 and 2013. 
 
Table 2. The Secondary Distribution of National Income from 2000 to 2014 
Year 
Secondary Distribution (Unit: 100 million Yuan) Proportion 
Household Government 
Non-financial 
Corporate 
Financial 
Institutions 
Household Government 
Non-financial 
Corporate 
Financial 
Institutions 
2000 66,538.67 14,314.06 17,152.68 517.59 67.90% 14.61% 17.50% 0.53% 
2001 71,865.34 16,324.18 19,327.19 1,254.42 66.50% 15.11% 17.88% 1.16% 
2002 77,423.32 19,505.94 21,313.62 1,927.53 65.01% 16.38% 17.90% 1.62% 
2003 87,268.45 21,946.82 24,339.09 2,866.89 64.65% 16.26% 18.03% 2.12% 
2004 98,508.92 26,517.58 33,246.66 3,075.63 61.78% 16.63% 20.85% 1.93% 
2005 112,910.16 32,573.69 36,987.87 3,100.65 61.49% 17.74% 20.14% 1.69% 
2006 131,426.42 39,724.85 42,687.11 4,303.44 60.87% 18.40% 19.77% 1.99% 
2007 158,558.63 51,192.09 54,207.96 5,284.53 59.51% 19.21% 20.35% 1.98% 
2008 185,926.31 60,544.07 65,450.94 7,106.18 58.83% 19.16% 20.71% 2.25% 
2009 207,302.37 62,603.34 64,171.08 8,405.70 60.91% 18.40% 18.86% 2.47% 
2010 243,121.74 74,116.25 72,069.17 13,206.55 60.82% 18.54% 18.03% 3.30% 
2011 285,772.58 90,203.21 78,990.47 15,179.18 60.99% 19.25% 16.86% 3.24% 
2012 321,399.16 101,301.11 78,875.93 16,855.35 62.02% 19.55% 15.22% 3.25% 
2013 357,113.36 110,375.99 100,204.35 14,963.20 61.23% 18.93% 17.18% 2.57% 
2014 391,109.95 121,574.23 116,262.29 15,932.81 60.66% 18.85% 18.03% 2.47% 
Source: the same as Table 1. 
 
According to Tables 1 and 2, the proportion of the residents dropped firstly and then rose slightly after 
experiencing the low point in 2008. But overall, it has fallen by about 6 percentages during this period. 
The change in the division of the national income has once become a hotspot for many parties, who 
believed that it is closely related to the phenomenon of low consumption rate in China. Relevant 
research conducted by scholars such as Bai Chong’en calculated the declining proportion and had 
influence on the mainstream views of the academic circle in China.  
However, the influential view that has been directly confirmed by Tables 1 and 2 constitutes an 
incompatible paradox with another equally influential achievement. According to Wang Xiaolu’s 
research, there is a huge amount of off-the-books incomes in China’s national income distribution, 
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which is not reflected in the data of the National Bureau of Statistics. It is a hidden income. In 2008, the 
total scale was about 4.6 trillion Yuan. According to another round of his estimation, the basic 
conclusion was that in 2011, the total scale of off-the-books income in China was 6.2 trillion Yuan, 
which was equivalent to 12.2% of GDP. The distribution of such hidden income was extremely uneven: 
63% of this income belonged to the top 10% high-income families and 80% of this income belonged to 
the top 20% high-income families. 
Wang Xiaolu’s research results attracted great attention and had great influence on mainstream 
opinions. However, scholars such as Bai Chong’en put forward their view according to the research 
conclusion of the official statistics, which was precisely different from that of Wang Xiaolu. Taking the 
great influence into consideration, the proportion of the residents’ income did not decline, but should 
rise according to the basic logic. In the end, there will be discussions of different opinions. But limited 
by various conditions, the quantitative results of various views cannot be very accurate. However, it 
should be noted that the unique value of Wang Xiaolu’s research results is undeniable, that is, including 
the non-standard income problem that people have already felt in real life into the serious academic 
research framework. Although the quantitative analysis results cannot be precise in the specific value, 
we cannot deny its significant practical significance from the perspective of the nature of the problem. 
In other words, neither shall we be limited to understand the problems of the income distribution in 
China only by the official figures of the Bureau of Statistics, nor shall we be limited to the declining 
proportion of the residents’ income. We should explore the income distribution structure behind the 
hidden off-the-books income in depth, that is, the income gap, the property gap, the fairness and 
standardization of income distribution, and their relevant institutional reasons in depth.  
Regarding to the issue of “large income gap” from the perspective of the resident income distribution 
structure in China, it has long been concerned by all parties. According to the official data of the Gini 
coefficient, it reached a historical high point of 0.491 in 2008, and then gradually decreased, but it 
remained at above 0.46 in 2016, which was still too high. China’s Gini coefficient calculated by 
non-official research group was often significantly higher that the official value. For example, the 
research conclusion of the Ganli team of Southwestern University of Finance and economics was as 
high as 0.61. Corresponding, the Gini coefficient of the distribution of the residents’ property was 
higher. China People’s Livelihood Development Report 2015 formed by China Family Panel Studies 
(CFPS) of the Peking University was based on baseline samples of 14,960 households in 160 districts 
and counties in 25 provinces and cities across the country. The result was that the Gini coefficient of 
the property of households across the country expanded from 0.45 in 1995 to 0.73 in 2012. The top 1% 
households occupied about one-third properties of the country, and the bottom 25% households had a 
total of only 1 % properties (Refer to Table 3). 
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Table 3. Comparison of Gini Coefficients of Various Sources 
Gini Coefficient National Bureau of Statistics 
CHFS in Southwestern 
University of Finance and 
Economics 
CFPS in the Peking University 
2002 0.454 - 0.55 (property) 
2003 0.479 - - 
2004 0.473 - - 
2005 0.485 - - 
2006 0.487 - - 
2007 0.484 - - 
2008 0.491 - - 
2009 0.490 - - 
2010 0.481 0.60 - 
2011 0.477 - - 
2012 0.474 0.61 0.49/0.73 (property) 
2013 0.473 - - 
2014 0.469 - - 
2015 0.462 0.60 - 
2016 0.465 - - 
Source: Organized according to public reports. 
 
A particularly critical understanding is that the unfair and non-standard income distribution is 
inseparable from the widening gap of the residents’ income and wealth. A large amount of hidden 
income, including off-the-books incomes (involving various non-standard distributions that should not 
be directly identified as illegal and disorderly) and black income (involving criminal acts such as 
corruption), are considerable in quantity and cannot be ignored in the distribution pattern. Its causes 
shall be naturally focus on the lack in the effectiveness of relevant institutional supply, and shall be 
corrected with the reform. 
If we take into account the non-standard off-the-books income estimated by Wang Xiaolu at the scale 
of 5-6 trillion Yuan, the scale of the residents’ income has not been reduced in these years, but likely to 
has increased. It is difficulty to identify the increased scale and thus unable to form authoritative 
interpretation. However, based on the logical relationship between common sense and related 
indicators, we should know that part of the hidden income alleged by Wang Xiaolu will be transferred 
from the non-resident sector to the resident sector in the financial and statistical information, which will 
not affect the total GDP of China, but affects the structure of the income distribution. But the other part 
will be used in the way of meeting expenses with cashes and will not enter the financial and statistical 
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information. So it is logical to say that this part should be additive factors affecting the total amount of 
China’s GDP, that is, the contribution factors to the total income. But in fact, this addition will 
certainly not be accepted by official statistics departments. We would like to emphasize in particular 
that, under various constraints, based on Wang Xiaolu’s research results, quantitatively increasing the 
total scale of China’s GDP is considered to be non-operable, but it is appropriate and necessary to 
increase the share of the resident sector from the perspective of China’s internal structure of GDP. As 
for the increase, it is indeed difficult to determine accurately, but at least this review has significantly 
dilute the need to focus on the declining proportion of residents’ income, and it has inspired us to pay 
more attention to the true problems of China’s national income distribution, unfairness, 
non-standardization and income gap. In particular, we should follow the logic of reform to deeply 
understand the underlying institutional causes associated with it, and then explore effective 
countermeasures. 
Liu He pointed out: “The income distribution gap is the biggest imbalance in China’s economy.” 
(Comments for Peng Wensheng’s monograph The Drifting Dividends-Seeking a New Balance in China 
(Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013)). The non-standardization and unfairness inherent in the 
income distribution gap are mainly caused by inadequate practices, corruption, power and money 
transactions, turning public properties to private properties, and loss of state-owned assets, etc. due to 
insufficient institutional supply in real life. It is the most serious problem. It is related to the basic 
well-being of the people, the fairness and justice of the society, and the fate and future of the ruling 
party and the country. It is one of the core and key issues that need to be resolved in order to ensure 
proper income distribution in China in contemporary. 
 
2. Understanding and Judgment of the Significance of the Mle Class, and the Challenges of 
Cultivating the Middle Class 
The recognition of the basic income distribution pattern in China requires special attention to the 
situation of the Chinese middle class and their nutrition and strengthening. 
China’s basic aspiration in implementing its modernization strategy is a peaceful rise based on 
humanistic position, and maintaining and promoting the harmony between the internal and the external. 
The basic experience of linking income distribution to the harmonious state of society is that the 
cultivation and expansion of the mid-income class “middle class” is an important condition for 
promoting and achieving social stability and harmony. The society in which the mid-income class 
becomes the main body of society, and the higher-end rich and the lower-end poor are a minority, 
which can be visually called “olive” (“small at both ends and large at the middle” resembling an olive), 
is a society with the most stable and harmonious characteristics. There are a large number of 
mid-income class people with “constant properties”, who tend to have the “perseverance” of dedication 
and joy, and relatively small wealthy class above the middle class and lower-class below the middle 
class. Objectively, it helps to alleviate the contradiction between the high and low ends. The empirical 
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situation of many advanced economies is the basic basis of this judgment. The obvious difference 
between China and this type of society is considered to be the situation requiring efforts to change. This 
is the inner logic and necessity of cultivating and strengthening mid-income class. 
Naturally, the middle class will increase when transiting from the excessive egalitarianism under the 
traditional system to the situation of “some people and some regions getting rich first” in the reform 
and opening up. However, at present, there are stilling different understandings and many tangles about 
how to estimate the development of the middle class in China. In particular, the basic understanding on 
the following two levels is explained. 
First, in terms of related concepts, it should be emphasized that the mid-income class is a relative and 
qualitative concept. The so-called relative concept means that we should not care too much about the 
absolute value of comparison with other economies, and we should mainly look at the up-down 
contrast between the residents in the economy in which they reside. The so-called qualitative concept is 
to understand that the mid-income class should be such members of the society: they have constant 
properties. Chinese people value the house and car (especially when they have a house, they should not 
be a slave to the house in pain). In addition, there must be a certain amount of savings, matching 
high-level living services in education and medical care, etc., and corresponding social security system. 
Besides, they should also have the ability to enjoy leisure life such as tourism. For such a mid-income 
class, to understand it qualitatively, we should further explore how to eliminate some illusions and try 
to get closer to the real situation with reference to the existing official statistics.  
In 2016, according to the data from the National Bureau of Statistics, the national residents were 
divided into quintile income groups. The basic situation was shown in Table 4 and Figure 1. 
 
Table 4. Statistics of Quintile Income Groups of National Residents in 2016 
  Per capita disposable income (Unit: Yuan) Proportion of total disposable income 
Low income group 5529 4.23% 
Lower middle income 
group 
12899 9.88% 
Middle income group 20924 16.02% 
Upper middle income 
group 
31990 24.49% 
High-income group 59259 45.37% 
Note. The quintile income grouping of the national residents means that all households surveyed are 
arranged in descending order of per capita income level, and are divided into five equal parts. The top 
20% income group is high income group, followed by upper middle income group, middle income 
group, lower middle income group and low income group. 
Source: 2016 National Economic and Social Development Statistical Bulletin on the website of the 
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National Bureau of Statistics. 
 
 
Figure 1. Statistics of Quintile Income Group of National Residents in 2016 
Source: the same as Table 4. 
 
Official statistics showed that for the quintile income groups of the Chinese, it seemed intuitively that 
the two groups with the highest income together accounted for 69.86% of the total per capita 
disposable income, of which the highest income group accounted for 45.37%. Seen from the 
distribution of the income structure of social members, one-fifth households held nearly one-half of the 
total income, and another one-fifth households held about one-fourth of the total income. This was 
another statistical perspective different from the Gini coefficient, which showed the disparity in income 
distribution in China. It should be pointed out that the real income difference in Chinese society 
reflected by this statistical result is still seriously inadequate. The very important reason is that this set 
of quintile statistics mainly comes from household surveys, which are reported by people voluntarily 
(involuntary surveyed households are skipped when selected). In real life, no wealthy one is really 
willing to report. Those who have off-the-books income and black income and have done in-depth 
research with Professor Wang Xiaolu generally do not report. Even when he did, he would not truly 
report his off-the-books income or black income. Therefore, when these household survey data are put 
together, we cannot say that it is meaningless, but it is quite far from the truth of Chinese society. It 
cannot fully reveal the structural differences between the actual income, the inverted pyramid shape of 
wealth possession, and the positive pyramid shape of the population from the perspective of income 
distribution of Chinese residents. It covers the true situation of the middle class income and makes the 
relevant judgments on the growth of China’s middle class tend to be optimistic.  
Secondly, the existing middle class in China is suffering from more obvious anxiety, which reflects the 
Per capita disposable income (Unit: Yuan) 
Low income 
group 
Lower middle 
income group 
Middle income 
group 
Upper middle 
income group 
High income 
group 
Proportion of total per capita disposable 
income 
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outstanding challenges at this stage. 
It should be pointed out that among the “new middle class” people in China that have formed, various 
objective causes have also contributed to a higher degree of “anxiety” in their subjective mental state, 
which is manifested by the obvious stability characteristics different from that of the middle class in 
other economies. In July 2016, the British The Economist stated in a special report that there were 225 
million middle class people in China, who were the most anxious group in the world. The report 
defined the Chinese middle class as people whose annual household income was between $ 11,500 and 
$ 43,000, which was about an annual household income from 80,000 to 300,000 Yuan. This range was 
not measured according to annual household income and was still questionable. The standard was low, 
but the size of the amount should not be too outrageous. The estimates that were similar to it were the 
size estimates of McKinsey and Boston Consulting: in 2020, China’s mid-class population would reach 
300 million or even higher. In other words, among the nearly 1.4 billion people, with the exception of a 
few high-income members (certainly less than 100 million) and mid-class members of about 300 
million, the rest were all low-income members and lower mid-income members below the middle class.  
The anxiety of the middle class is mainly due to the rising price of housing, the obvious threat to 
environmental safety, and the increasing burden of children’s education, medical care and future 
pensions, too much overwork and the tension brought by squeezed personal time, and so on. How to 
eliminate these anxieties and enable them to fully reflect the role of helping social stability is the 
specific challenge China faces in nurturing and expanding the middle class. It is imperative to grasp the 
substantive disadvantages of China’s income distribution as a whole and the decisive institutional 
reform issues associated with economic and social issues, and to targetedly find ways to properly 
resolve conflicts and eliminate anxiety. 
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